Blog 15 -- 4/9/14

A good many interpretations of Solomon’s selection on Jean-Paul Sarte were offered on Wednesday, but only one resonated with my own. The student suggested that ‘I am only responsible for those things I, myself, decide are responsibilities.’ This was immediately countered by opposing views which suggest man has social duties and that such a paradigm could only be supported by solitary living. In his response to those counterarguments, the gentleman provided us with a literal example of his responsibility to ensure no children are hit as he drives his car and how this responsibility, though perhaps a ubiquitously-recognized duty to his fellow man, is no formal obligation at all.

While the aforementioned reference may seem a bit farfetched, I believe the foundation of the argument gives rise to some very applicable implications. For starters, this notion of personally conceiving one’s own responsibility is consistent with what Sartre says on page 211 in Robert Solomon’s Existentialism when he states “…one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature”. By this Sartre denies the legitimacy of the herd mentality as a force worthy of bearing any influence over man’s existence; furthermore, the individual ought not to accept responsibility over anything that jeopardizes the maintenance of his own freedom. The second instance derived from our classmate’s analogy lies at the opposite end of the spectrum—the other extreme—wherein one’s responsibilities has the potential to become conflated with the will of God. Unfortunately, the sort of absence of freedom to which I speak that leads to widespread religious ignorance and violence is a much more prevalent threat than the former “unrestricted freedom”. This lifestyle can be summarized by its lack of freedom entirely, the antithesis of Sartre’s “man is freedom” (211).

However, both extremes—free and enslaved thinking, god or godless paradigms—produce individuals who see themselves as above the rest. In the former, man has no obligation to anything but himself and therefore the concerns of others are not to be his own; in the latter, man orients himself entirely about God and His will (It is true that for many, God’s will resides in the service of others; however, for some, His will takes on a more violent identity. In the end, all is for God and nothing—good nor bad—is truly for one’s fellow man).

Yours Tru.ly