An inquiry was made last Wednesday--during our discussion of "Bad Faith"--as to whether or not it is possible for someone to exhibit bad faith in real-time. After much deliberation over subjects vaguely relevant to the subject-matter, as seems to be the norm, it would seem the question remains unanswered. To this I shall try my very best to conjure up an appropriate response, one that acknowledges time as being of utmost importance to Sartre's bad faith. To begin, let us recall that as per the definition offered to us by the afternoon's speakers, transcendence is very much future-oriented. Conversely, seeing as facticity refers to things as they are, one might assume that this element of bad faith could ONLY exist in the present as neither the past nor the future can definitively speak to how things actually are currently. And yet, we find that bad faith cannot exist without one or the other (past or future). Present and future are necessary to retrospectively validate whether or not one has acted in bad faith, a posteriori. In essence, whether one presently reflects on actions of the past, or whether (s)he will reflect in the future on actions of the present or past is not important. Rather, it is the reflection--which, by its very definition requires time to separate the reflection from the event upon which one reflects--that is important here. That said, to suppose that an individual can act in bad faith in real-time is to suppose that reflection can also take place in the same sense. Earlier in the semester, Thad suggested this could be, and is, done. I am not convinced, at least not the extent of reflection to which I am referring (the kind that has an individual staring at a blank wall for an indeterminate amount of time). In summation, I do not believe that an individual is capable of acting in bad faith "instantaneously"; rather, I would argue Sartre's understanding of facticity and transcendence imply a sort of temporal dichotomy at the root of his bad faith.
Yours Tru.ly
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